

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS BEAUMONT DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
\$ CASE NO. 1:02-CR-74

LUIS HERNANDEZ-HERNANDEZ

\$

FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLEA OF TRUE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Local Rules for the District Court, Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred this matter for hearing and the submission of findings of fact and a report and recommendation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401(i) and 3583(e). The United States alleges that Defendant, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez, violated conditions of supervised release imposed by United States District Judge Thad Heartfield. The United States Probation Office filed its *First Amended Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision* requesting the revocation of the defendant's supervised release.

The Court conducted a hearing on August 30, 2011, in accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, 32 and 32.1. Defendant was present and represented by counsel at the

hearing. Having heard the evidence, this court factually finds that the defendant has violated conditions of supervision and recommends that such violation warrants the revocation of his supervised release.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the Court finds:

- a. That Defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the plea of true in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.
- b. That Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, that his plea of true is a knowing and voluntary plea, not the result of force or threats, and that the plea is supported by an independent evidentiary basis in fact establishing each of the essential elements of the conduct.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

A. Procedural History

On October 10, 2002, The Honorable Thad Heartfield, United States District Judge, sentenced Hernandez-Hernandez after he pled guilty to the offense of assault of a correctional officer, a Class E felony. Judge Heartfield sentenced the defendant to 30 months imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release subject to the standard conditions of release, plus special conditions to include deportation; mental health aftercare; drug aftercare; and a \$100 special assessment. On February 12, 2011, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez was released from prison and on March 10, 2011, he was deported to Mexico.

B. Allegations in Petition

The United States alleges that the defendant violated the following mandatory condition of supervised release:

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

Specifically, on or about March 10, 2011, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez was deported to Mexico. On or about June 14, 2011, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez was arrested by the Brownsville Police Department on the charge of public intoxication, after he illegally reentered the United States.

C. Evidence presented at Hearing:

At the hearing, the Government offered the following evidence as its factual basis for the allegations set out *supra*. If the case proceeded to a contested hearing, the Government would offer evidence establishing that on or about March 10, 2011, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez was deported. The Government would also show that on or about June 14, 2011, the defendant was found in the United States after illegally re-entering when he was arrested by the Brownsville Police Department on charges of public intoxication.

Defendant, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez, offered a plea of true to the allegations. Specifically, Mr. Hernandez-Hernandez agreed with the evidence presented and pled true to the allegation that he committed another crime by re-entering the United States illegally and by being arrested for public intoxication in violation of his supervision conditions.

D. Sentencing Guidelines; Findings and Recommended Disposition

The allegations, supporting evidence and plea of true warrant revocation of supervised release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Court factually finds by a preponderance of the evidence

that the defendant violated a mandatory condition of his supervised release by committing another crime while on supervised release.

If the Court finds that Hernandez-Hernandez violated his supervision conditions in the manner stated above, this will constitute a Grade C violation under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a). Upon finding a Grade C violation, the Court may revoke the defendant's supervised release. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2). Based upon the defendant's criminal history category of VI and the Grade C violation, the Sentencing Guidelines suggest a sentence of imprisonment for a period ranging from eight (8) to fourteen (14) months. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Because the original offense of conviction was a Class E felony, the statutory maximum imprisonment term upon revocation is one year, less any time the defendant has already served in prison for a previous revocation. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Accordingly, the Guideline Range is capped at twelve (12) months in this case by the one year maximum statutory term of imprisonment for a Class E felony.

The Fifth Circuit states that Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the revocation of supervised release is advisory only. *See United States v. Cade*, 279 F.3d 265, 271 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing *United States v. Montez*, 952 F.2d 854, 859 (5th Cir. 1992); *United States v. Headrick*, 963 F.2d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1992)). Because Chapter 7 was promulgated as an advisory policy statement and there are no applicable guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised release¹, the Court may impose a greater or lesser sentence upon revocation. *United States v. Gonzalez*, 250 F.3d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 2001). Further, a sentence imposed for revocation will be upheld unless it is in violation of the law or plainly unreasonable. *Id. See also United States v.*

¹ See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 1 ("At this time, the Commission has chosen to promulgate policy statements only.")

Pena, 125 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Here, the evidence and the defendant's own admission supports a finding that he violated his supervision conditions. The Court, therefore, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a Grade C violation of his supervision conditions by committing another crime while on supervised release. The defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled true and agreed with the Court's recommended sentence for the violation.

Accordingly, based upon the defendant's plea of true, the agreement of the parties, and the evidence presented in this case, it is the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the District Court accept the plea of true and revoke the defendant's supervised release. The undersigned magistrate judge further recommends that the District Court order Defendant, Luis Hernandez-Hernandez, to serve a term of **twelve (12) months imprisonment**, with no further supervision term upon his release in this cause.

OBJECTIONS

Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party's failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to *de novo* review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, *see Rodriguez v. Bowen*, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, *see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass 'n.*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual

evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

SIGNED this the 1st day of September, 2011.

KEITH F. GIBLIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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